Standing Committee D

[Mr. Bill O'Brien in the Chair]

Courts Bill [Lords]

Ordered, 
 That the Order of the Committee of 26th June 2003 be amended as follows— 
 In the Table— 
(a) in the entry for 1st July, in the second column, for ''Clauses 46 to 65, Schedule 5; Clauses 66 to 85.'' substitute ''Clauses 46 to 57.''; 
 (b) in the entry for 8th July, in the second column, for ''Clauses 86 to 94;'' substitute ''Clauses 58 to 65, Schedule 5; Clauses 66 to 94;''.—[Ms Bridget Prentice.]

Clause 27 - Justices' clerks and assistant clerks

Amendment proposed [this day]: No. 34, in 
clause 27, page 12, line 23, after '2(1)', insert 
 'to be clerk of a local justice area'.—[Mr. Hawkins.]
 Question again proposed, That the amendment be made.

Bill O'Brien: I remind the Committee that with this we are discussing the following:
 Amendment No. 37, in 
clause 27, page 12, line 24, at end insert 
 'appointed to serve on one or more local justice areas.'.
 Amendment No. 35, in 
clause 27, page 12, line 28, leave out 'or'.
 Amendment No. 36, in 
clause 27, page 12, line 29, at end insert 
 'or 
 (d) is appointed with the agreement of the chairman and deputy chairman of the local justice area.'.
 Amendment No. 38, in 
clause 27, page 13, line 1, at end insert 
 'appointed with the agreement of the clerk of the local justice area.'.

Christopher Leslie: Before the break, I think that I had dealt with amendments Nos. 34, 37 and 38, which were largely about the process of appointment of justices' clerks and their assistants. My concern was that the amendments would be undesirable in terms of normal civil service employment practices.
 I now want to consider amendments Nos. 35 and 36, tabled by the official Opposition. Amendment No. 35 is largely a paving amendment for amendment No. 36, which would result in the Bill stating: 
''A person may be designated as a justices' clerk''
 if he or she is appointed 
''with the agreement of the chairman and deputy chairman of the local justice area.''
 I have a number of concerns about that proposal. The amendment would require the Lord Chancellor to hold such consultations before making the appointment, and that would be impractical, as it would require him to decide on the area to which he would assign the clerk before the appointment, and then to consult the local bench on the appointment. That would severely restrict the flexibility that a new courts agency would achieve, and the new business processes that we want put in place. 
 It would also be undesirable for the chairman and deputy chairman of an area to be able to veto staff appointments made by the Lord Chancellor; there will be ample opportunities for normal consultation, as we said earlier in our proceedings. Clause 21 gives the Lord Chancellor the duty to take reasonable and practical steps to consult lay justices on matters affecting the performance of their duties and to ascertain their views on such matters. I assure the Committee that magistrates will be consulted on such relevant matters—for example, before a change in the assignment of a justices' clerk to an area. Clause 27(4) gives the Lord Chancellor the duty to consult the chairman or his or her deputy on the lay justices assigned to the area. 
 I hope that in the light of my comments, and those that I made before we adjourned this morning, the amendment will be withdrawn.

Nick Hawkins: Welcome back to the chairmanship of our proceedings, Mr. O'Brien. I am grateful to the Minister for what he has put on the record, before and after the Adjournment, and in the light of his reassurances, I am content to beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
 Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Nick Hawkins: I beg to move amendment No. 39, in
clause 27, page 13, line 7, at end insert— 
 '( ) Before the Lord Chancellor takes steps to remove a justices' clerk from office he shall— 
 (a) consult the justices for the relevant local justice area, 
 (b) consult the courts board for the area which includes the relevant local justice area, and 
 (c) consider any recommendations made to him by the justices, the courts board or the justices' clerk who is under notice of removal.'.
 This amendment would have a slightly different effect.
 We were talking about consultation before people were appointed, but we are now talking about the need for some level of protection before anyone is removed from the position of justices' clerk. It would be helpful if there were consultation with both the lay justices and the courts boards before the removal of a justices' clerk was contemplated. Their recommendations, or any representations by the clerk, should be considered. 
 I hope that the Minister will understand that we are trying to provide a level of employee protection in the Bill, and I will listen with interest to what he has to say on the subject.

David Heath: I welcome you to the Committee this afternoon, Mr. O'Brien. I also welcome my hon. Friend the Member for North
 Norfolk (Norman Lamb), fresh from his travails on the Finance Bill Committee. He will, no doubt, return there in the near future.
 I agree with the view expressed by the hon. Member for Surrey Heath (Mr. Hawkins), but not with the precise wording of his amendment—I hope that he can live with that. There seems to be a need for some sort of protection for justices' clerks, beyond that which is available through normal employment protection. They have a judicial function, if not a judicial post, so it seems appropriate that something should be laid down in statute regarding the process of their removal. 
 My only quibble with the hon. Gentleman is the wording of paragraph (c) of his amendment, which states that the Lord Chancellor shall 
''consider any recommendations made to him by the justices, the courts board or the justices' clerk who is under notice of removal.''
 It occurs to me that a recommendation from the person who is about to be sacked might be that he should keep his job. ''Representations'' would be a better term.

Nick Hawkins: Of course I am not wedded to my wording. It might interest the hon. Gentleman to know that in the long watches of the night when I was preparing today's speeches on the amendments, I thought the same thing. I should have included the words ''or representations by'', which is why I used the word ''representations'' rather than ''recommendations'' when I spoke to this group of amendments. If I had not drafted them late at night, I might have included those words.

David Heath: The hon. Gentleman must get to bed earlier—but his argument does not detract from the case that he has made, which I support. I look forward to hearing what the Minister has to say.

Christopher Leslie: The amendment would require the Lord Chancellor to consult both the justices of the relevant local justice area and the courts boards covering that area, before taking steps to remove a justices' clerk from his or her post. It would also require the Lord Chancellor to consider representations made by the justices, the courts boards or the justices' clerk himself or herself before taking such a step. While I understand the motivation behind the issue—given that the posts are important and that it is necessary to take great care over such matters—the amendment is undesirable. It would require the employer—the Lord Chancellor—to consult widely on what might be sensitive staffing issues and personnel matters.
 For example, it might be inappropriate to consult the courts boards on the assignment, or removal, of a justices' clerk, when they might have a strategic role in local statutory matters. They will not be the employers' body, nor will they represent the interests of local magistrates. In the event of a clerk being removed from his post, there would be nothing to prevent local courts boards, magistrates or justices' clerks themselves from making such representation to the new courts agency. That is what I imagine will be normal and likely, should those organisations and bodies choose to do that. 
 In the course of employment it can happen that certain individuals need to be removed from their posts for very delicate and sensitive reasons, so such widespread consultation may not always be appropriate. 
 However, I assure the Committee that in practice, magistrates will continue to be consulted about decisions that affect them, including the assignment or removal of a justices' clerk. Clause 21 gives the Lord Chancellor a duty to take reasonable and practical steps to consult on matters affecting the lay justices and the performance of their duties, and to ascertain their views on such matters. We tabled amendments in the other place to make it clear not only that justices' clerks are to be assigned to particular local justice areas, but that the chairman of the justices must be consulted before a clerk's assignment is changed. That consultation matters, not the wider question of a person's employment or suitability for employment by the new agency. Justices should not be prevented from expressing views on such matters, but they should not have a natural entitlement to do so.

Norman Lamb: If chairmen of the justices are to be consulted on changes to assignments, surely it would be appropriate for them to be consulted on proposed dismissal. Consultations can certainly be on a confidential basis, and it is appropriate that they should be. According to normal employment law principles, for a dismissal to be fair, those people ought to be consulted. Best practice must dictate that the Lord Chancellor, based at the centre, should be consulting at local level before dismissing a clerk under such circumstances.

Christopher Leslie: Clearly, the new courts agency will have a local structure that will be able to deal in the normal way with employment matters. Hon. Members are employers these days, so they will be familiar with the need to take great care to ensure that should somebody need to be removed from their post, procedures are gone through and sensitivity is applied to certain issues that can arise in the course of employment. A rigid requirement to consult the courts board, for example, as set out in paragraph (b) of the amendment, would not always be appropriate, because it will not be the employer. As I said, there is already latitude in the provisions to allow for consultation, and for representations to be made. They are adequate in their present form.
 There is also a minor technical problem with the title ''courts administration council'' as opposed to ''courts board'', but I will not make a big deal about that. There are reasons why the amendment is not absolutely correct in that regard, but I have made the substantive point that sensitive personnel matters could be involved. Such wide and rigid consultation requirements will not always be appropriate. On those grounds, I hope that the amendment will be reconsidered.

Nick Hawkins: It is helpful to have the Minister's reassurances on the record. Were there to be a dispute about the need for consultation about the removal of a justices' clerk, those involved can now refer back to the Hansard report of this Committee's proceedings and
 read what the Minister said on behalf of the Government. It was worth while tabling the amendment and I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman for his usual courtesy in addressing the matter seriously.
 We were grateful for the Government's response in another place. The Minister touched on the fact that the Government had responded to concerns raised by my noble Friend Baroness Anelay of St Johns and other noble Lords about the matter. We have explored the matter sufficiently and now have some reassurance on the record, so I do not need to press the amendment to a Division. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment. 
 Amendment, by leave, withdrawn. 
 Clause 27 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 28 - Functions

Nick Hawkins: I beg to move amendment No. 40, in
clause 28, page 13, line 10, leave out 'things' and insert 'matters currently'.

Bill O'Brien: With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
 Amendment No. 41, in 
clause 28, page 13, line 10, leave out second ', to'.
 Amendment No. 42, in 
clause 28, page 13, line 13, leave out 'things' and insert 'matters currently'.
 Amendment No. 43, in 
clause 28, page 13, line 13, leave out second ', to'.
 Amendment No. 44, in 
clause 28, page 13, line 15, at end insert 
 'and not by any other person'.

Nick Hawkins: I admit to the Committee that I am being pedantic in this group of amendments and I make no apology for that. The clause begins by stating:
''Rules may make provision enabling things authorised to be done by''.
 When I read that, I thought that it was not the wording that I normally see in a Bill that will become an Act of Parliament. The word ''things'' is ugly in such legislation. Therefore, I tabled a group of amendments to change it, so that we have the wording that we are more used to seeing in Bills and Acts. I also felt that it was unusual for the Bill to suggest that things would be done ''to a single justice'', and that it was better to have matters being dealt with ''before'' single justices or benches of magistrates. 
 I hope that Committee members will understand where I am coming from. With great respect to the parliamentary counsel who drafted this Bill, I genuinely believe that it would look more fitting if we referred to ''matters'' rather than ''things''. 
 However, one amendment in this group is of slightly more substance than the others—amendment No. 45. [Interruption.] I have just checked my notes. 
 Amendment No. 45 has not been selected, so I cannot talk about it. I conclude by saying that I hope that the Minister will say that he accepts that the Opposition's phraseology is more elegant than the Government's.

Christopher Leslie: There was a famous occasion when the former American President, Bill Clinton, spent hours discussing the meaning of the word ''is''. I know that we do not wish to open up some of those matters.
 The Parliamentary Private Secretary, my hon. Friend the Member for Crawley (Laura Moffatt), has suggested sotto voce that ''stuff'' could also easily be used as a replacement word. I do not think that either that or ''matters'' would be better than ''things'' in this instance. However, perhaps I should stick to the points that it has been suggested sorrythat I raise. 
 Clause 28 sets out the functions of a justices' clerk and empowers the Lord Chancellor to make rules allowing a justices' clerk or an assistant to a clerk to perform the functions of a single justice of the peace. The clause remodels section 45 of the Justices of the Peace Act 1997, which is to be repealed under the Bill. The clause introduces no new powers and no significant changes are anticipated to the advisory or judicial functions of the justices' clerks. 
 Amendments Nos. 40 and 42 change 
''things authorised to be done''
 to 
''matters currently authorised to be done''
 in subsection (1) and subsection (2). I am told that that adds little to the clarity of those subsections. 
 I hear what the hon. Member for Surrey Heath says about the need to use appropriate wording. I am advised that the word ''things'' has been transposed from section 45 of the Justices of the Peace Act 1997, although I cannot remember exactly which political party may have helped in drafting that.

David Heath: Things are not what they used to be.

Christopher Leslie: The hon. Gentleman says that things are not what they used to be. To quote from one of the Labour party's slogans, things can only get better, and we intend to pursue that aim.
 I am sorry to say to the hon. Member for Surrey Heath that his amendment does not add anything to the meaning of the clause. I am unclear what he intends the word ''currently'' to mean. Does it mean the date of Royal Assent, when the clause can be enforced, or when the reader is looking at it? That is a bit of pedantry that I can throw back at him. 
 Amendments Nos. 41 and 43 similarly seek to delete the second instance of the word ''to''—how one pronounces it depends on the part of the country from which one comes—from the phrase 
''to be done by, to or before a single justice''.
 The Government feel that that makes no discernible improvement to the wording taken from the Justices of the Peace Act 1997, which has stood the test of time since it was implemented. Apparently, the phrase 
''by, to or before''
 a person is not uncommon in legislation. It appears, for example, in the Criminal Justice and Police Act 2001 and the Charities Act 1993.

Norman Lamb: I wonder whether the Minister will give some examples of what it is envisaged would constitute things done to a single justice.

Christopher Leslie: I am sure that I could, but I am not sure that I should like to do so at the present moment. Should I feel the need to elaborate, I may do so on Report. Who knows when we may return to this matter? I stand by the points that I make.
 The clause seems to be perfectly clear as it stands. It replicates a provision in the 1997 Act, which works adequately and is currently in force. Although I understand the points raised by hon. Members, far be it from me to tamper with the good advice and wise voices of parliamentary counsel. I shall stand by them to the hilt on this matter.

Nick Hawkins: The Minister said that things can only get better. As my hon. Friend the Member for Henley (Mr. Johnson) wisely observed, was that in the Labour manifesto? I do not think that the British people necessarily feel that things have got better.
 I do not want to take up the Committee's time. However, in asking whether the Minister could think of a single example of something being done to a single justice, the hon. Member for North Norfolk asked an especially apposite question. The fact that that phrase might have been used in other legislation in a different context was not a good answer to our amendments. Will the Minister write to all Committee members, not only to the hon. Member for North Norfolk and to me, to give some examples of where he and parliamentary counsel believe that something would properly be done to a single justice of the peace? If he cannot think of one, perhaps he will table a Government amendment on Report to correct the drafting.

Gareth Thomas: As a member of the Bar, the hon. Gentleman no doubt recalls making applications to a judge or a justices' clerk. That is rather different from making applications before them, which suggests that those could be made on paper, not necessarily in person. The wording is not otiose in that respect. That is my stab at it.

Nick Hawkins: I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman. He will remember that he and I have crossed swords as advocates in the past. I see that his imagination has not deserted him since the mid-1990s, when he became a Member of Parliament.
 I hope that the debate has been useful, if only to parade the knowledge of the hon. Member for Somerton and Frome (Mr. Heath) on song titles. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment. 
 Amendment, by leave, withdrawn. 
 Clause 28 ordered to stand part of the Bill. 
 Clause 29 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 30 - Places, dates and times of sittings

David Heath: I beg to move amendment No. 2, in
clause 30, page 14, line 17, at end insert— 
 '( ) Before giving any direction under subsection (1), the Lord Chancellor shall consult with— 
 (a) the relevant courts board; 
 (b) any local authorities whose area includes the relevant local justice area or a part of the local justice area.'.

Bill O'Brien: With this it will be convenient to discuss the amendment No. 129, in
clause 30, page 14, line 33, after 'place', insert 
 'in the local justice area'.

David Heath: Amendment No. 2 deals with the now familiar subject of locality, proximity, accessibility—call it what you will. It makes the point that directions may be given under clause 30(2)
''to ensure that court-houses are accessible to persons resident in each local justice area.''
 Clause 30(1) states that 
''The Lord Chancellor may give directions as to the places in England and Wales at which magistrates' courts may sit.''
 The amendment will ensure that, before making the direction, the Lord Chancellor will consult with the relevant courts boards, which have a duty to scrutinise and review such arrangements, and local authorities in the area, which may be said to speak for the local community at large. The amendment takes a belt-and-braces approach so that, as far as possible, the community can make sure that access to justice is maintained locally between the people who are running the courts, working in them and using them, and the general public who have a legitimate interest in the court remaining in their area. 
 The point at issue is to ensure that courthouses are available and accessible to the local community, which, as expressed through the local authority, has a locus in such matters. At present, the local authority is often involved in proposals to close courts—often, the primary objection comes from the local authority. For example, Mendip district council led the campaign to save Frome court in my constituency from closure. Local justice was needed. Apart from all the issues that we have raised about the workings of the court system, we must bear it in mind that, more and more, particularly in rural areas and small communities, there is a feeling that the justice apparatus is becoming more remote, that local people no longer have the police presence that they once had and the direct accountability of the forces of law and order. 
 The courthouse is a physical manifestation of the fact that there still is an engagement for the community in respect of law and order, and local justice. It is an important aspect. The Minister would do well to consider how local authorities are brought into the loop effectively in respect of consultation to ensure maximum local consensus about such matters. 
 Amendment No. 129 deals with a slightly different issue, although it might seem similar. It would introduce the words 
''in the local justice area''
 to subsection (5), which states: 
''The places are—
(a) a place in the local justice area in which the offence is alleged to have been committed;
(b) a place in the local justice area in which the person charged with the offence resides;
(c) a place in the local justice area in which the witnesses, or the majority of the witnesses, reside''.
 That is fine until paragraph (d), which states 
''a place where other cases raising similar issues are being dealt with''.
 That does not refer to the local justice area. 
 At our first sitting, the hon. Member for Witney (Mr. Cameron) raised the concept of batch processing. That is a worry to magistrates, who consider that either they will be doing the same business in a repetitive way, or that business will be taken away from them, leaving them only with lesser fodder for their courts. It may be deemed extremely efficient and effective to have that done at a remote location in a centralised court for an area, but that would be inconvenient for everyone else involved. It would be extremely inconvenient for the court officials to deal in Bristol with all the parking offences in the Avon and Somerset police authority area. That would be extraordinarily inconvenient for someone who committed a driving offence and who happens to live on Exmoor or at the other end of the authority area. Such a situation is not ruled out under the present arrangements. Inserting the words 
''in the local justice area''
 would mean that, if we are to have batch processing of similar cases, we at least retained the sense of locality and the convenience for the local court user, as well as the convenience of the system. Reducing things to more manageable proportions will prevent some of the proposals from having the sausage-factory effect, which many people find rather repugnant. The Minister might not be able to accept my amendment, but can he explain why 
''in the local justice area''
 is not included in paragraph (d)? I suspect that he wants to have a single processing court for dealing with large numbers of similar offences in a place remote from where the offender, witnesses, legal representatives, police officers and everybody else are living. If so, he is advancing an argument for a rather remote and inefficient form of justice, which I personally deplore.

Nick Hawkins: We agree with the Liberal Democrat amendments.

Christopher Leslie: I was hoping that the hon. Member for Surrey Heath would elaborate a little, but that was not to be the case. Now that he has concurred completely with the Liberal Democrats, I shall try to answer the points raised.
 The measures in clause 30 should make courts more accessible by removing restrictions on where magistrates courts can sit, and by allowing the use of non-court buildings, if that is appropriate. Moreover, giving the new unified administration control of the 
 entire court estate will afford greater opportunities for co-location of county courts within magistrates courts in rural areas. 
 I shall address the two amendments to clause 30 separately. Amendment No. 2 relates to the requirement to consult, and its effect would be to require the Lord Chancellor, when giving directions as to the places where magistrates courts may sit under subsection (1), to consult the relevant courts board and any local authorities whose area included the relevant local justice area or part of the local justice area. That is a reasonable point to raise, and I understand some of the concerns of the hon. Member for Somerton and Frome, but that provision is not desirable. 
 First, under provisions in the Bill courts boards will, for the first time, give a voice to a wide section of those communities in relation to all the courts. That is a much more inclusive and genuinely consultative approach, and the courts boards will add a great deal. Under clause 5, courts boards will be involved in the development of plans for their area, which will include any proposals to open, close or relocate courthouses in the context of the area's overall business plan. To place a duty on the Lord Chancellor, when exercising his powers under subsection (1), to consult those who have already had an input into decisions regarding the court estate is a tad superfluous. 
 Secondly, placing a duty on the Lord Chancellor to consult any local authority whose area includes the relevant local justice area would be unduly restrictive. As we have already heard, clause 8(7) provides a definition of a local authority, but that definition includes police authorities as well as borough councils, county councils, district councils, London boroughs and police authorities. To expect the Lord Chancellor to consult all those bodies when exercising his powers under subsection (1), when it is expected that he will exercise his powers only in limited circumstances—for example when determining the days on which courts will close for civil service holidays—is over the top. Having said that, it is fair to suggest that we should think a little more thoroughly about how we might bring local government into the loop a bit more, as the hon. Member for Somerton and Frome said. 
 I was not involved in the drafting of the provisions but, looking at them, I can certainly see the virtue in some of the hon. Gentleman's points. It would not be appropriate to make the amendment, but I shall certainly talk to officials about the interaction between local government and other bodies, although I am not making any promises. 
 Amendment No. 129 would mean that, under the directions in subsection (3) concerning 
''the distribution and transfer of the general business of magistrates' courts'' ,
 the places where the person who is charged with an offence is required to appear would include, under subsection (5)(d), a place 
''in the local justice area''
 where 
''other cases raising similar issues are being dealt with''.
 That is not particularly desirable. 
 Paragraphs (a) to (c) of subsection (5) all include a reference to 
''a place in the local justice area''
 because in each of the circumstances described there is a definite link to a specified locality, namely the place in the 
''area in which the offence is alleged to have been committed'',
 the place 
''in which the person charged with the offence resides'',
 and 
''a place . . . in which the witnesses, or the majority of the witnesses, reside''.
 There is no such local link in the ''similar issues'' categorisation. 
 Furthermore, the provisions in paragraph (d) allow a case to be heard at a venue more suited to a particular kind of case, for example a venue with specialist facilities such as video links or a high level of security. Those facilities might not be available in the local justice area where the offence was alleged to have taken place, and where the majority of witnesses or the person charged reside. The amendment would seriously reduce our ability to make better use of the court estate and the greater flexibility as to where cases can commence that underpins clause 30. 
 The hon. Gentleman's particular concern was about batch processing and taking all cases of a particular sort to a warehouse, presumably at a distance from and out of contact with those concerned. I hear what he says, but the purpose of subsection (5)(d) is not to achieve batch processing but to allow trials to be held at locations with better facilities, often more appropriate to the nature of the trial concerned. I have mentioned security issues, which can often be a consideration. On the number of ineffective trials, sometimes the nature of facilities can inhibit the swift processing of justice. That was largely the rationale behind subsection (5)(d). 
 There is no particular reason why we should not proceed with the measures and keep the flexibility in the Bill. As I said, provisions in the clause and elsewhere are aimed at removing current statutory restrictions on where magistrates courts can sit. For example, they are currently unable to sit on licensed premises. Removing such restrictions would introduce greater flexibility and would allow the use of non-court buildings in local areas, where that is appropriate. The amendment is not necessary, and I hope that the hon. Gentleman will withdraw it.

Andrew Miller: I understand my hon. Friend the Minister resisting amendment No. 129 because it is too restrictive, but I ask him to consider some aspects of the issue.
 Clearly, it is not unusual for cases that involve much local feeling, security issues, specialist information technology and communications facilities or specialist facilities for children to be moved around, and that is fine. Facilities for 
 dealing with children and similar cases being dealt with in a locality are explicitly encompassed under subsection (5)(d). 
 Batch processing—I use that phrase again—goes against good local justice. For example, a gentleman from my locality came to see me a few years ago complaining about how he was being treated after a breach of television licensing regulations. I told him that he was guilty and that, if I were him, I would pay up. However, he had a good point about the process of justice. The case was being heard in Northwich, which is not, in the absence of a motor car, the most accessible part of Cheshire, especially from Ellesmere Port. Prior to the Opposition's closing the court, that case would normally have been heard in Ellesmere Port. 
 Nowadays most cases are heard in Chester, where there is a combined bench. There is a good bus service from Ellesmere Port and Neston into Chester, but it is one hell of a journey to Northwich. Some kind of guidance is needed on listing, so that magistrates courts clerks can ensure that careful consideration is given to the circumstances of the accused, even if it might be more efficient, from the point of the view of the management of the court, to deal with centralised cases. 
 Even though my advice to the gentleman was, ''Do not see a lawyer, you are guilty, full stop. I suggest you plead guilty and pay up,'' he had the right as a citizen to put his case—his mitigating argument. That was removed from him by virtue of how the case was listed. He would have needed to stay overnight because of the timing of the case. Certain adjustments are necessary to overcome some of the rural difficulties, notwithstanding the good reasons why subsection 5(d) should remain as it is.

David Heath: I thank the Minister for his response, especially on matters relating to local authorities. His brief, however, protested too much. He and I have both served on local authorities and we know that there are all kinds of statutory consultations on all sorts of things. It does not take much work to ensure that the people on the list are aware of proposals and have the opportunity to make representations, if they wish to do so. He has said that he will consider that matter again, for which I am grateful.
 I am also grateful for the support of the hon. Member for Ellesmere Port and Neston (Mr. Miller) on amendment No. 129. The more I listen to him, the more I think he agrees with the amendment on extending the principle of accessibility beyond the narrow view of the clause, with which we started the entire proceedings.

Christopher Leslie: In case I do not have an opportunity to thank my hon. Friend the Member for Ellesmere Port and Neston for what he said, I draw the Committee's attention again to subsection (2), which says:
''In exercising his powers . . . the Lord Chancellor shall have regard to the need to ensure that court-houses are accessible to persons resident in each local justice area.''
 That gives the measure of protection that my hon. Friend was looking for.

David Heath: The Minister is right; it does. Let us not repeat the arguments. I draw his attention to the fact that subsection (2) contains the words:
''In exercising his powers under subsection (1)''.
 We are talking about matters of listing, which do not appear in subsection (1). That is precisely the point I was trying to get through to the Minister the other day. It is all very well saying that the Lord Chancellor will have regard to the places where courts will sit, but not the cases that are presented before them; accessibility is still an issue in interpreting the rest of the clause, let alone in the rest of the Bill. However, that is a matter for another day. 
 I hear what the Minister says about his intentions in terms of subsection (5)(d), and they are laudable. I do not disagree for one moment that where there is a need for enhanced security provision, interpretation or video linking—which the hon. Member for Surrey Heath and I had reason to discuss in the Standing Committee considering the Crime (International Co-operation) Bill only a couple of weeks ago—there are good reasons for sitting elsewhere. 
 However, that is not what the paragraph currently states. My reading is that 
''a place where other cases raising similar issues are being dealt with''
 refers to the legal issues arising from the case—in other words, the type of case it is, rather than ancillary issues such as the provision of security or interpretation facilities. That is a reasonable reading of that paragraph.

Nick Hawkins: As the hon. Gentleman knows, I entirely agree with his point, and I venture to say that the way that he views paragraph (d) is the only way that it can be interpreted. It provides for what we call batch processing. The hon. Gentleman may know that, in respect of, for example, fixed penalty cases, a particular court is already used to send things out for the whole of the rest of the country. Northampton, one of the areas in which my former chambers were located, is one of the courts that is used for sending things out over the whole of England. Admittedly, they are intended to be dealt with by post, but there is a great temptation to move in the direction of administrative convenience, and both the hon. Gentleman and I are concerned that we should not allow administrative convenience to take over from the need to ensure that people can have a hearing at a place that is convenient for them.

David Heath: I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman for that. What he says is right. I was being generous to the Minister by suggesting that the provision could be construed in the way that he wishes. That is not its primary construction.
 We know that there are efficiency savings to be gained by centralising these things. That is the call centre mentality. A call centre, or trial centre for all the same sort of cases will be much cheaper to administer. There will be a temptation to put everything up in Strathclyde, for example—eventually, it might all be moved to Bombay, and everybody will be listed for a huge court in the Indian subcontinent, which will be 
 very cheap to run. That is the natural extension of what is being proposed. 
 I am not suggesting that that is in the Minister's mind at present. However, the fact is that that is what he is providing for in subsection (5). I ask him to look at that again. If it is genuinely his intention not to facilitate batch processing, as we call it, but to deal with the exceptional cases that need facilities beyond those that are provided in the local justice area, there is a better way of phrasing the clause, perhaps by referring to an exception, so that it states that the above will not apply where specific facilities are required in the interests of justice. Something along those lines would ensure that the Minister could do what he wants to do, without encouraging the use of remote courthouses to deal with a large number of cases of a similar type, which is most people's interpretation of the provision as it currently stands. 
 I ask the Minister to think about whether the clause can be worded better so as to achieve what he wants to achieve—let me not accuse him of bad faith. If he does not give attention to the matter, I will want to come back to it on Report, and perhaps at a later stage. In the meantime, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment. 
 Amendment, by leave, withdrawn. 
 Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

Boris Johnson: I rise to speak on clause stand part, because I am not sure whether I shall have a further opportunity to make these points. They are directly connected with the question of places, dates and times of sittings. I speak in favour of a particular group that I believe should have access to courts—''persons resident'' in the local area, to whom reference is made in subsection (2). I am talking about members of the press, a group with which I have some familiarity in my capacity as a columnist on the Henley Standard, a post for which I receive no payment whatsoever.
 It is a shame that amendment No. 46 was not selected for debate, because it perfectly expresses how the clause should be drawn up. It would be worrying if members of the press did not have ready access to the courts. The Minister may be unfamiliar with the Henley Standard's open justice campaign, but I can fill him in. 
 There are two problems. First, as we discussed earlier, the Henley court was closed, followed by the Thame court. Secondly, once everything is moved to Oxford, no lists will be sent to groups of residents in the ''local justice area'', including newspaper journalists, of what cases are to be heard. It will therefore be impossible for newspapers to provide the vital service of telling the local community who is being tried and for what. They will not be able to play their part in the administering of justice by providing the vital utensil of public shame. It is an important part of local justice that cases should be reported in local newspapers. 
 Without wishing to try your patience, Mr. O'Brien, I ask for an assurance that the Government will 
 include newspapers in their thinking about who should have access to the courts in the local justice area. Not only should they have access to the courts but they should know what cases are coming up and should be able to report them freely. I think that the Minister will agree that that is an important part of administering justice locally.

David Kidney: May I say how much I agree with the hon. Gentleman that part of the local administration of justice is the reporting of cases to the public in the local area?

Bill O'Brien: Order. Amendment No. 46 was not selected. I allowed the hon. Member for Henley to make his point, but I am not prepared to allow a discussion on it.

Christopher Leslie: After that admonishment, Mr. O'Brien, I am not sure how to respond. However, I understand the legitimate point raised by the hon. Member for Henley. He spoke of the role of the press as a utensil of justice, and he wants to ensure that the press know what cases are listed for the various courts. I have not seen the vehicle by which the lists are transmitted to the local press, although I am becoming increasingly familiar as inspiration comes to me.
 I understand that lists are available from the justices' clerks, wherever they are located, and I am told that they can be obtained over the telephone. Other methods of publicising the lists may be used in different justice areas. One of the benefits of the new courts agency, with its unified administration, is that we could consider taking a national approach. Some magistrates courts areas may follow a traditional approach but we could look at best practice in order to ensure that lists are made available to the press and the media. I would be happy to consider that.

Nick Hawkins: I suggest that this may be a way for the Minister to make his mark in the first few days and weeks in his new role. If he were to adopt a crusade to ensure that every magistrates court gave lists, with details of all cases, to all local newspapers in their areas, it would please not only my hon. Friend the Member for Henley. I have had approaches from a number of organisations representing the media; the problem affects not only the Henley area. The degree of helpfulness of justices' clerks to parts of the local media differs widely. I realise that the Minister will take time to look into the matter and I hope that when he goes back to his Department he will think about issuing a ministerial fiat that says that all justices' clerks should smarten up their act in order to please my hon. Friend the Member for Henley. If they do not, he has his column in his local newspaper—

Bill O'Brien: Order. We are straying from the fact that amendment No. 46 was not selected, so we should not discuss it any further.

Christopher Leslie: Except that I entirely agree. The clause deals with places, dates and times of sittings. As technology develops, we might well have an e-enabled shadow Solicitor-General and the hon. Member for Henley might well be wired up to the internet. Crown court listings are available electronically on the
 internet. Under unified administration, there is no reason why we should not consider making magistrates courts listings available electronically. I am not able to promise to do it immediately, but it might be desirable and it is important for us to investigate it further. I hope that the virtues of clause 30 are apparent and that it will stand part of the Bill.
 Question put and agreed to. 
 Clause 30 ordered to stand part of the Bill. 
 Clauses 31 to 35 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 37 - Designated officers and magistrates' courts

David Heath: I beg to move amendment No. 130, in
clause 37, page 18, line 3, leave out 'justice of the peace'.

Bill O'Brien: With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
 Amendment No. 131, in 
clause 37, page 18, line 7, leave out 'justice of the peace'.

David Heath: This is a probing amendment. The clause deals with the designated officer, a title that refers to the fines officers mentioned in clause 36. I am not clear how the designated officer can relate to an individual, such as a justice of the peace, rather than to the court in which that JP sits, the magistrates court, or the local justice area if the jurisdiction extends beyond a single court. At the moment, the words ''justice of the peace'' signify an individual in relation to whom the designated officer acts. The object of the amendments is to enable us to understand in which circumstances an officer can be designated to act in relation to an individual rather than to a court.

Christopher Leslie: The clause allows the Lord Chancellor to designate members of the courts agency staff to perform certain statutory functions in relation to the business of a magistrates court. Many of those functions are currently performed by a justice's chief executive within the magistrates courts committee. The statutory post of JCE will cease to exist in the new courts agency, and as a direct result the former functions of the JCE will rest with the Lord Chancellor. Where appropriate, he will nominate a designated officer of a magistrates court to perform them. It is envisaged that that will mean little change in practice, as the functions will continue to be carried out by the members of staff to whom the work is presently delegated.
 Amendments Nos. 130 and 131 would both remove the term ''justice of the peace'' from subsection (1). The clause reflects the fact that the references to justices' chief executives in current legislation are many and varied. Some such references are being amended by the Bill to read, ''designated officer''. However, as the references are varied, the clause is drafted to cover all eventualities in which the term ''designated officer'' will apply. 
 As drafted, the clause highlights that it is not practicable, nor in all instances desirable, to change all legislative references from JCE to ''designated officer'', for example in legislation pertaining to pension or 
 compensation arrangement for JCEs. Removing the reference to justice of the peace in the clause would mean that any reference to a designated officer and a justice of the peace in an Act would not be covered by clause 37. That would in turn lead to confusion about what is meant by the term ''designated officer'' in those circumstances. 
 Furthermore, the clause follows the same pattern as existing legislation where JCEs are mentioned in the same provision as justices of the peace. One example of such a reference is in section 16 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984. Removing the words ''justice of the peace'' from this clause is therefore undesirable, given the need for consistency and watertight drafting arrangements. On those grounds, the amendment should be withdrawn.

David Heath: I do not think that that was the clearest explanation I have ever heard. I am still puzzled by the fact that the Bill already contains a definition of the functions of a single justice of the peace as being those of a court, or, in the case of a justices clerk or assistant clerk, as being those of a magistrates court. It therefore seems that the term ''magistrates court'' includes any potential reference to a justice of the peace acting alone. I still find it difficult to understand how an officer of the court could act for a justice of the peace, but not for the court through which the justice of the peace exercises his functions. That is an important distinction about the way in which a designated officer would work.
 I am sure that the Minister's advice is proper, and that it is too difficult to ensure that there is no reference to a justice of the peace somewhere in statute, but I would have thought that a watertight change in definition of what comprises a court for this purpose could include the actions of a justice of the peace. That would be a rather better way of dealing with the problem in statute so that we do not have to keep on inserting phrases that will be repeated in Bill after Bill, year after year and century after century for no reason other than to confuse those who want to interpret legislation. Will the Minister confer with his officials to consider whether there is a better solution other than an anomalous reference in a clause? I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment. 
 Amendment, by leave, withdrawn. 
 Clause 37 ordered to stand part of the Bill 
 Clauses 38 to 40 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 41 - Disqualification of lay justices who

Christopher Leslie: I beg to move amendment No. 21, in
clause 41, page 20, line 27, at end insert— 
 '( ) No act is invalidated merely because of the disqualification under this section of the person by whom it is done.'.
 I should like at the outset to put this amendment in context. Clause 41 deals with the disqualification of lay justices who are members of local authorities—in other words, councillors. It provides that a magistrate who is a member of a local authority may not sit in cases where that authority has an interest. It replicates 
 section 66 of the Justices of the Peace Act 1997, which included a provision which meant that no Act was to be invalidated merely because a justice was disqualified. That provision was removed in the other place because of concerns about ''fair tribunals'', arising from article 6 of the European convention on human rights. 
 The Government remain satisfied that the inclusion of that provision does not infringe article 6. The Joint Committee on Human Rights published its agreement with that view in its fourth report for the 2002–03 session. Its members are satisfied that the clause, as originally drafted, did not infringe article 6 of the ECHR. The Government pay considerable attention to the views of that Committee, and we do not believe that we should disagree with it on this occasion. We consider that it would be inappropriate for the amendment that was tabled in the other place to stand, and that is why we are seeking to move the amendment to correct it at this stage. 
 Article 6 of the ECHR refers to the determination of a party's civil rights and obligations, or of any criminal charge against him. Where the justices act in circumstances that do not engage the article, or where the participation of the individual does not violate it—as may be the case at an interlocutory hearing on uncontentious matters—the subsection would provide that the action would not be invalidated merely because of the disqualification. If it is felt that article 6 applies in a particular case, it is always possible for a party to appeal. Where no prejudice is caused by the magistrate's disqualification, it would be unreasonable and burdensome to invalidate those decisions.

Nick Hawkins: As the Minister says, there was a lot of debate about that issue in another place, and it will not be helpful to repeat it all this afternoon. We took the view—it may be that the hon. Member for Somerton and Frome, whose noble Friends are also involved in debating the matter, does so too—that it would have been better if the judgment taken by another place had been allowed to rest. We are disappointed that the Government have chosen to reverse it, but we understand where the Minister is coming from. He says that the Joint Committee is content and that the Government do not want to second guess, or undermine, the judgment of the Joint Committee.
 Having said we are disappointed that the Government have chosen to reverse the decision of another place, it would not be helpful to go over that ground again. I will restrict my remarks to saying that I suspect that we may have to go back to the matter on Report, if we still feel that that would achieve something positive. At this stage, I leave my remarks at that. 
 Amendment agreed to. 
 Question proposed, That the clause, as amended, stand part of the Bill.

David Heath: Is there a satisfactory definition of ''local authority'' anywhere in statute that does not require the whole lot to be repeated in future definitions? I refer particularly to the inclusion of
 separate clauses for the Corporation of the City of London and the Common Council of the City of London. It is such a waste of paper and statute time. There should surely be a definition of ''local authority'' that clarifies the expression under the wording of a particular Act.

Christopher Leslie: I am tempted to pass on the hon. Gentleman's comments to the Common Council of the City of London, but I suspect that its members would not be particularly grateful to receive them. We should make similar provision under the clause as that set out in section 66 of the Justices of the Peace Act 1997, which provided for the various disqualifications of magistrates who were members of the local authorities. Definitions of ''local authority'' differ in different parts of the Bill, so we have to make sure that we are thorough in our explanation and description; it is better to be thorough than to miss things.
 Question put and agreed to. 
 Clause 41, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 42 - Effect of Act of Settlement on

Christopher Leslie: I beg to move amendment No. 22, in
clause 42, page 21, line 1, leave out 'before 31st January 2002' and insert 
 ', whether made before or after the passing of this Act,'.
 Clause 42 will validate retrospectively the appointment and acts of several foreign magistrates who are not nationals but who were appointed before 31 January 2002 in unwitting breach of the nationality requirements of the Act of Settlement 1700. The amendment would avert the effect of the Act of Settlement in respect of lay magistrates. During the debate on the Bill in another place, Lord Goodhart attempted to introduce a similar amendment. My noble Friend Baroness Scotland gave an undertaking that we would consider what he was suggesting and table such an amendment during our consideration of the Bill, even though future legislation is planned in respect of nationality and the civil service. 
 As will be clear from the amendment, we have decided to legislate on the point at this stage. It will enable Ministers to operate a more flexible approach to appointing people who are not necessarily citizens of the UK, the Commonwealth or the Republic of Ireland and avoid potentially embarrassing legal challenges arising from EU legislation. Given that it is the policy of the Department for Constitutional Affairs to broaden the recruitment base for lay magistrates, it is something that should be welcome. The form of discrimination set out in the provision is now defunct and should be changed by the amendment. I hope that the Committee will agree.

Nick Hawkins: We welcome the Government's action. As the Minister said, it is a concession to those on the Opposition Benches. Not only Lord Goodhart for the Liberal Democrats in another place,
 but my noble friends Baroness Anelay of St. Johns and Lord Renton have expressed their worries about the matter. It is undoubtedly an improvement to the Bill and it shows that there is a purpose in our debating such matters. Both Houses can achieve a better Bill. The amendment removes an anomaly and we welcome the Government's change of mind to recognise what was rightly said from our Benches and the Liberal Democrat Benches in another place.

David Heath: I thank the Government for listening to our argument.
 Amendment agreed to. 
 Clause 42, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill. 
 Clauses 43 to 45 ordered to stand part of the Bill. 
 Schedule 4 agreed to.

Clause 46 - Power to transfer criminal cases

Nick Hawkins: I beg to move amendment No. 58, in
clause 46, page 22, line 10, at end insert 
 'after hearing representations from all parties, including those representing the interests of the victim, lay and professional witnesses and defendants'.
 This is an important amendment. When there is talk of criminal proceedings being transferred, we say from the Conservative Benches that it is extremely important not to allow the transfer without hearing representations from all parties, including in particular those who are representing the interests of the victims of the crime. 
 For many years, I have been involved with the organisation Victim Support. I have spoken to groups in various parts of the country, before joining the Front Bench of my party and since. I know that hon. Members on all sides of the House have had great involvement with Victim Support. Clause 46 inserts a new section 27A in the 1980 Act, but a statement should be clearly inserted in the Bill to the effect that, before a case is transferred, the victims have the right to be heard. That is because there is nothing worse for a victim of a crime—I have met victims of the most serious crimes, as have MPs from all parties—than to be told suddenly that the whole matter is being transferred, perhaps for good reasons, to a court in a different location that is much less convenient for them to get to. I am sure that many hon. Members have received harrowing letters from constituents who have been the victims of crime, or met such people in their surgeries, as I have. 
 We should not miss the opportunity to put into law provisions that say that the victims have a right to be heard before the case is moved. Even if there are good reasons for the transfer and there is a chance that it will go through in the end without any difficulty, as long as the victims feel that they have had an opportunity to make their point of view heard, they will at least feel that something relevant has happened, despite their probable concern if it is inconvenient for 
 them to get to the new venue. I hope that the Minister will respond positively to that suggestion. 
 Sitting suspended for a Division in the House. 
 On resuming—

Christopher Leslie: Amendment No. 58, tabled by the hon. Member for Surrey Heath, would require a magistrates court to hear representations from all parties, including those representing the interests of the victim, lay and professional witnesses and defendants, before transferring a matter. The hon. Gentleman raised an important issue, and I would even go so far as to say that I am attracted to the sentiments behind the amendment. Nevertheless, I need to set out the fact that if a magistrates court decides of its own volition to transfer a case, the parties would have a right to be heard. Moreover, there would be practical difficulties with the amendment were it to be adopted.

Nick Hawkins: I am grateful to the Minister for the helpful way in which he began his response. Does he accept that in some situations, someone might be regarded as being within the general category of a victim of a crime, without necessarily being automatically regarded as a party to criminal proceedings? Parties to criminal proceedings are the prosecution and the defence. I hope that, as part of his his sympathetic response, the hon. Gentleman will consider the fact that one of the difficulties is that often the victim of a crime may be a witness, but not a party to the proceedings. I am sure that he will understand the significance of that argument.

Christopher Leslie: Indeed. I was about to say that we have set out where courts should sit, and their location. Clause 30(5) covers several such considerations. We must have regard to victims, witnesses and defendants when deciding whether to transfer a matter. Directions will, in particular, require a court to take account of where the offence was committed and where the majority of witnesses and the person charged with the offence reside. That applies also to transferred matters. We consider that many issues are already covered by clause 30.
 Given its wording about representation and the representatives of various parties, an additional difficulty with the amendment is that it does not make clear whether it would require the relevant individuals' views to be ascertained before a case could be transferred. If that meant the views of all the individuals, a lot of work could be involved, which would cause significant delays. It could make the transfer of cases less convenient for everyone, rather than more convenient, which must be our objective. 
 We do not want additional costs to be incurred. To insist on separate legal representation for each witness, as well as the parties, would be a strange route to go down. We accept that occasional difficulties may be involved about where a case should be heard, but it would not be desirable to impose requirements that may not be necessary in ordinary cases and which may cause delay, extra complexity or cost. 
 That said, I reiterate the fact that the protections in clause 30(5) ensure that consideration will be given to the location of witnesses and others involved in proceedings. Although I sympathise with the aims behind the amendment, in practical terms it would not be the best measure to take.

Nick Hawkins: I detect that the Minister is coming to the end of his remarks, and, given the sympathetic way in which he has responded, I shall not press the matter to a Division. However, is he prepared to continue considering the issue as the Bill wends its way through Parliament? We could all try to come up with a formulation that would avoid the problems that he identifies; I do not suggest that my wording is perfect. I hope that the Minister and his officials are prepared to continue to look into the matter, perhaps with a view to introducing a Government amendment. We genuinely want to be constructive; we want to find a way to ensure that victims are consulted in some way, without that causing delays. It would be helpful if the Minister were prepared to agree to that.

Christopher Leslie: I shall certainly talk again with officials; I would be happy to do so. Obviously, in transferring criminal proceedings from one court to another, we have to balance the virtues of increasing the effectiveness and efficiency of the proceedings with those of not jeopardising the legitimate need of witnesses, victims and others taking part in court proceedings to have easy access. We have discussed that in debate on several other clauses already. I am not entirely persuaded that we have not already adequately covered many of the matters set out in the amendment, but I am happy to keep the matter constantly under review. It is fair and laudable for hon. Members to be concerned about this issue, but I do not think that the amendment is the right one to put in the Bill.

David Kidney: I can foresee many cases in which, early in the proceedings, only the prosecutor, the defendant and the defence solicitor, and none of the witnesses and victims, are present. The court will consider whether it should transfer the case to another court, because it is more convenient or whatever. Under clause 30(3), which relates to the direction that may be given by the Lord Chancellor, the magistrates could be asked to bear in mind the interests of those who are not there, such as the witnesses and victims, and to consider whether, in particularly serious cases, they ought to adjourn to get the views of such people. There is no requirement to do so in every case, but at least the matter would be in the magistrates' minds in every case.

Christopher Leslie: My hon. Friend makes a valid point. Indeed, much of what is in clause 30 and elsewhere suggests that such issues should be considered by those forming judgments on the transfer of cases. Having focused on the amendment—as we are properly bound to do in Committee—I must say that I do not believe that, as framed, it is targeted in the right direct manner, and I therefore hope that it will be withdrawn.

Nick Hawkins: The Minister has given a helpful reassurance, and has confirmed that he will carry on talking to officials. If we can come up with a better
 form of words that avoids the difficulties to which he has drawn attention, we will do so, and we will send it to him and his officials. The Government clearly recognise that we are talking about a serious issue, as the Minister has said, and as he understands the spirit behind our attempt to amend the Bill, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
 Amendment, by leave, withdrawn. 
 Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

David Heath: Under suggested new section 27A(3), there is rightly a provision that if once proceedings have started the hearing is transferred to another court, it must begin hearing the evidence and the parties again. How would that apply to the admissibility of evidence, where the first court had decided that evidence was not admissible? Would it be a requirement for that process to happen a second time? That would seem foolish if a court had ruled that on a matter of law evidence was inadmissible, given that that inadmissible evidence might prejudice the views of the magistrates hearing the case.
 We talked at length about that danger in the proceedings on the Criminal Justice Bill: because the magistrates are finding on both fact and law, they have to hear evidence of, for instance, bad character, which might then prove to be inadmissible. It is odd to require a second court to be prejudiced by that inadmissible evidence if the hearing is then transferred.

David Kidney: May I remind the hon. Gentleman that when he and I served on the Standing Committee on the Criminal Justice Bill—which has not yet completed its passage through Parliament—there was a new possibility of magistrates making binding directions ahead of the trial? I presume that if that is enacted in that form, those will become binding, even if the case is transferred somewhere else.

David Heath: The hon. Gentleman is right. That was part of what I was trying to elicit from the Minister. Do such actions form part of the proceedings, or are they prior to the proceedings? In other words, once the case is transferred, does it have to happen again with a new set of magistrates hearing the same matters in a different place? It would be better if it did not. The original ruling should stand, and the evidence should not have to be considered again, in so far as it dealt purely with the admissibility of the evidence that might be produced before the court. As things currently stand, I think that it would have to be considered anew, and the whole of the proceedings would have to be repeated, including the consideration as to whether in law a piece of evidence was admissible.
 My question may be complicated, and I hope that I have expressed, at least broadly, my meaning in a way that the Minister can make sense of. If he has no answer to my question today, he might like to consider it further.

Christopher Leslie: The hon. Gentleman raises an important point. Part of clause 46 touches on what happens when deciding whether to transfer a case, and
 the fact that the court should take account of the directions made by the Lord Chancellor under clause 30, and that cases can be transferred before or after the beginning of a trial or inquiry,
''But if the court transfers the matter after it has begun to hear the evidence and the parties, the court to which the matter is transferred must begin hearing the evidence and the parties again.''
 The hon. Gentleman asked a specific question about pre-trial hearings, the admissibility of evidence and so forth. I do not want to prejudice a point that I do not want to be too definite about at present, but my initial advice suggests that those matters would have to be heard afresh should a case be transferred. However, if a ruling had already been made by one court about admissibility of evidence, that would seem a good reason for not transferring a particular case or matter. That is the advice that I have at present. If there is any change to that, I will write to the hon. Gentleman and the other Committee members to correct it. I hope that that is helpful to the hon. Gentleman.

David Heath: It is helpful in that the Minister has set out what he believes the position to be—but it is unhelpful in that I am not sure that that is what the position ought to be, in terms of common sense, let alone anything else.
 If material is adduced in a pre-trial hearing, or during the initial stages of a hearing, and is held to be inadmissible and prejudicial to the interests of justice, it seems odd that it might be considered anew at the next hearing. Perhaps there ought to be some rules of court to deal with such a situation.

Christopher Leslie: I stand by what I said previously. If, on reflection, there is a different interpretation of the hon. Gentleman's question, I shall be the first to bring it to the attention of hon. Members. There is a need to allow easier transfer of criminal cases between magistrates courts. Most Committee members would want that principle to be used, given the need to improve and enhance the flexible and efficient administration of justice. That is the purpose of the clause.
 Question put and agreed to. 
 Clause 46 ordered to stand part of the Bill. 
 Clauses 47 and 48 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 49 - Family proceedings courts

Nick Hawkins: I beg to move amendment No. 59, in
clause 49, page 23, leave out lines 31 and 32 and insert— 
 '( ) The Lord Chancellor may make rules under subsection (4) provided that he has— 
 (a) published the draft rules; 
 (b) consulted the Family Procedure Rules Committee; and 
 (c) had regard to their recommendations.'.

Bill O'Brien: With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
 Amendment No. 30, in 
clause 49, page 23, line 39, leave out subsection (2). 
Amendment No. 60, in 
clause 49, page 23, line 40, at end insert— 
 '( ) In discharging his duties under this section the Lord Chancellor shall make provision for the training of a sufficient number of lay justices to sit on family proceedings courts.'.
 Amendment No. 61, in 
clause 50, page 24, leave out lines 27 and 28 and insert— 
 '( ) The Lord Chancellor may make rules under subsection (4) provided that he has— 
 (a) published the draft rules; 
 (b) consulted the Criminal Procedure Rules Committee; and 
 (c) had regard to their recommendations.'.
 Amendment No. 62, in 
clause 50, page 24, line 36, at end insert— 
 '( ) In discharging his duties under this section, the Lord Chancellor shall make provision for the training of a sufficient number of lay justices to sit on youth courts.'.

Nick Hawkins: We now come to family proceedings. In due course we shall discuss other matters, such as youth courts. I am especially concerned about such things, not least because in my early years at the Bar I spent much time doing family law cases, both in the magistrates courts and the county courts. At one stage my hon. Friend the Member for North-East Hertfordshire (Mr. Heald), who is now in the shadow Cabinet, and I spent much time on such cases, working either together or on opposite sides. We used to meet in courts in places such as Peterborough and work on domestic violence injunctions. Because of the harrowing circumstances in so many of those cases, I am aware of the crucial importance of family proceedings, especially when we are talking about the protection of children.
 This group of amendments would require more than changes to clause 49—amendments Nos. 61 and 62 deal with clause 50. Amendment No. 59 would require the Lord Chancellor to consult and have regard to the views of the family procedure rules committee. On considering the matter last night, it occurred to me that I may have picked out the wrong subsection in my amendment. Perhaps I should have referred to subsection (6). If that is part of the Minister's response, I concede at the outset that I may have got it slightly wrong. On looking at how the amendment reads across to clause 50 I realise that I may not have got that quite right. 
 I hope that the Government will accept that our amendments might offer a better, clearer formulation than that of subsection (6). The Government are particularly keen on so-called pre-legislative scrutiny. However, we are talking about real pre-legislative scrutiny, whereby the views of the family procedure rules committee would be taken into account—this would not merely be a matter of consulting it. 
 We suggest, in amendments Nos. 30 and 60, that the Lord Chancellor must ensure that there is training and a large enough number of lay justices for the family proceedings courts. We also suggest that exactly the same changes should be made to clause 50, which deals with youth courts. That is just as valid. As lay justices, people need specialist training to deal with the difficult issues arising in youth courts—just as they do in family courts. 
 I hope that the Government will see that the amendments are genuinely intended to improve the Bill. I have made it clear that they are not perfect, but I hope that the Minister will respond constructively.

Christopher Leslie: I shall take amendments Nos. 59 and 61 together, as they both deal with the same subject, and then speak to the remaining amendments in the group. Amendments Nos. 59 and 61 deal with consultation on rules to be made under these clauses. They would require the Lord Chancellor to publish draft rules and to take into account the views of the respective rules committees.
 I am not sure that we would accomplish much by adding the word ''publish'' to the Bill. Apart from anything else, I am advised that it has no meaning in statute. It is common practice for Departments to consult on draft rules via websites, as well as to send copies to interested parties. That seems adequate.

Nick Hawkins: I am slightly concerned about the Government's increasing reliance on websites—almost to the exclusion of all else. although we want to encourage what is referred to as e-government—earlier, someone referred sotto voce to an e-enabled shadow Solicitor-General, and I am happy to be considered to be e-enabled—the Government must remember that hard copies are still important when they are consulting people in a traditional field such as the law. It will never be adequate for the Government just to put something on the website of the Department for Constitutional Affairs and to assume that everybody will see it.
 Not everybody is of the same generation as the youthful Minister who is putting forward the Government's case. I asked my—

Bill O'Brien: Order. This is supposed to be an intervention.

Christopher Leslie: I had forgotten that, too, Mr. O'Brien. One can get carried away by a persuasive argument.
 It is sometimes adequate to put details on the website, but it can also be necessary to send hard copies to interested parties; indeed, that is normal practice. We would not wish to row back from that. That explanation of how we publish, disseminate and consult should satisfy the hon. Member for Surrey Heath, and I hope that he will think again about that aspect of the amendment. 
 Subsection (6) already states that 
''Rules under subsection (4) may be made only after consultation with the Family Procedure Rule Committee.''
 I am not sure whether it is the hon. Gentleman's intention to replicate that demand elsewhere, but that would be the effect of the amendment. I should be concerned about that, given that there is already a requirement to consult. 
 Turning to the proposed duty to have regard to the recommendations of the rules committee, the courts have made it clear that in order to comply with any statutory requirement to consult, the person under the duty must conscientiously take into account the product of the consultation. That being the case, we are not sure that the proposed duty would add anything. If adopted, it might have the unlooked-for 
 and adverse consequential effect of suggesting that statutory references to consultation are deficient if they do not contain that phraseology. I am advised that that is another reason why we should be wary of inserting that provision in the Bill. 
 The amendments would also remove the subsections that allow the rules to confer powers on the Lord Chancellor. That is not a new provision; section 67(5) of the Magistrates Courts Act 1980 is similar. 
 As the clause already refers to the Lord Chancellor's powers in relation to authorisations, it makes sense for any rules under that clause to be able to do the same. I therefore hope that the amendment will be withdrawn. 
 As for amendment No. 30, magistrates exercise a wide jurisdiction in family cases, sitting as family proceedings courts. Because of the sensitive nature of family work, and the knowledge and understanding that are required, only certain magistrates exercise those specialist jurisdictions. Outside greater London, they are at present drawn from panels elected locally by their fellow magistrates. The relevant provisions are currently contained in sections 67 and 68 of the Magistrates Courts Act 1980. That system will no longer be appropriate when there is a national jurisdiction for magistrates, and the panel system will be abolished. Clause 49 provides for a better and more transparent procedure, by which only specially trained and suitable magistrates will be selected to sit in family proceedings courts. Those selected will have authorisation that will be valid throughout England and Wales. 
 In future the Lord Chancellor will have to authorise a justice of the peace before he or she can sit as a member of a family proceedings court, and will be able to delegate that power—for example, to the president of the family division or to the appropriate committees of justices. The Lord Chancellor will have the power to make rules regarding the allocation and removal of authorisations, the appointment of chairmen at family proceedings courts and the composition of those courts. It is envisaged that new rules that provide for a more transparent selection procedure will be published for comment and be subject to Parliament's approval. 
 Clause 49(2) repeals section 68 of the Magistrates Courts Act in respect of combined family panels for two or more petty sessions areas—now to be known as local justice areas. Those provisions will be obsolete, as the Bill abolishes petty sessions areas and gives magistrates a national jurisdiction. The amendment will therefore serve only to leave an unnecessary section in the 1980 Act, which I hope the hon. Gentleman can see would be neither desirable nor effective. 
 Finally, amendments Nos. 60 and 62 seek to impose on the Lord Chancellor a duty to make provision for the training of a sufficient number of lay justices to sit in family proceedings and youth courts. We recognise the valuable role that magistrates who take part in 
 family and youth jurisdictions play, and we are committed to retaining lay magistrates and encouraging them to sit in those jurisdictions. We are also aware of the importance of having sufficient authorised justices to sit in those jurisdictions. The effective running of those courts requires an appropriate number. 
 The power in the clause to authorise magistrates for specialist jurisdictions allows the Lord Chancellor to authorise the right number of people, and people of the right calibre, too. There is a balance to be struck between those two necessary aims, and the relevant amendments are not an appropriate way to deal with those concerns. I assure the Committee that we shall continue to seek to recruit lay justices of the right quality and to train them to the standards required to sit in both the family proceedings and the youth courts. As we are publicly committed to that aim, the amendments are unnecessary, and, moreover, might not achieve what they seek. On those grounds, I hope that the hon. Gentleman will withdraw the amendment.

Nick Hawkins: I shall not pursue the matter today. I said in my opening remarks that we were seeking a better formulation than the existing subsection (6). I went on a bit in my intervention, but I am still worried that the Government concentrate too much on websites—although I am glad that the Minister confirmed that it is his Department's practice to send out hard copies to appropriate consultees. I shall not purse the matter this afternoon, but I hope that the Minister will understand that we are concerned about both family courts and youth courts. We might want to return to those issues on Report, but for now I beg to ask to leave to withdraw the amendment.
 Amendment, by leave, withdrawn. 
 Clause 49 ordered to stand part of the Bill. 
 Clause 50 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 51 - Court security officers

Nick Hawkins: I beg to move amendment No. 63, in
clause 51, page 25, line 4, leave out 'may' and insert 'shall'.

Bill O'Brien: With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
 Amendment No. 64, in 
clause 51, page 25, line 6, after 'conditions', insert 
 '(including conditions as to good character)'.
 Amendment No. 29, in 
clause 51, page 25, line 7, at end insert— 
 '(2A) Regulations under subsection (2) shall require that no person who has ever had any kind of conviction for any kind of criminal offence may ever be considered for any appointment as a court security officer.'.

Nick Hawkins: We now turn to the important issue of court security—especially important in the light of the recent, heavily publicised escape of a couple of dangerous criminals as they were about to arrive at the Inner London Crown court. The escape was in no way the fault of the security officers at the court, but I am
 sure that it has brought into sharp focus the danger attendant on the security issue at and around our courts. I was particularly conscious of that episode because it took place just up the road from my flat in central London. My wife was watching the news flash that announced that two dangerous men were at large in Newington Causeway, and she wisely delayed her departure from the flat until a while later when, unfortunately for the forces of law and order, the two escapees had got clean away.
 Amendment No. 63 is the old traditional amendment that has been tabled before, not only to this Bill but to other legislation. If it is clear that the Lord Chancellor is to make regulations, clause 51 should state that he ''shall'' rather than ''may'' 
''by regulations make provision as to''
 training courses and conditions to be met. I am sure that the Minister will not say that the Lord Chancellor might make, or might think about, regulations; in practice there will be regulations, so the amendment is a small point—although I do not expect the Minister to accept it. 
 Amendment No. 64 is perhaps a matter of greater substance. In our view, previous criminal convictions should be a bar to employment as a court security officer. In the last Parliament I was fortunate enough to represent my party as shadow Minister with responsibility for the Private Security Industry Act 2001. I have taken a continued interest in that subject, but I know that the right hon. Member for Walsall, South (Mr. George) is probably the greatest living expert on the private security industry—I see the Government Whip nodding in agreement. He has made, I think, about half a dozen attempts over the years to secure a private Member's Bill to introduce proper standards for the security industry, and he was delighted to be involved in that Bill's passage. 
 Like this Bill, the Bill for the private security industry was dealt with in a constructive spirit. There were genuine attempts from both sides to improve it. The right hon. Member for Walsall, South and I were both at the launch of the new Security Industry Authority, and we felt that things were working well; it seemed that several of his misgivings were being reduced because of the way in which the new head of the SIA was operating. 
 There is a link between that legislation and this, because one of the purposes of having new security industry legislation was to prevent criminals from working in security. It was on that basis that I table amendment No. 64. It is crucial that we do not run into the problem of somebody who might have had links with crime in the past being employed in that capacity. 
 Such people might no longer be criminals; perhaps the conviction was relatively minor and happened 20 years ago, and the individual has put it behind them—we are all in favour of the rehabilitation of former offenders. However, in the security industry, blackmail could be used by those who are involved in serious and organised crime, and might want to organise escapes from courts. 
 If there were something in a security officer's past that he wanted to keep secret, somebody could say to him, ''Unless you help us, we'll have you all over the News of the World,'' or another tabloid. It might be a huge scandal that a person who had had a criminal conviction 20 or 30 years ago was employed as a court security officer. 
 As a matter of principle, it simply should not be possible to employ someone who has had a criminal conviction in that particularly sensitive job. 
 If the Minister understands the purpose of our proposal, I hope that he will at least say that he will consider with his officials whether he can suggest some wording that might be an improvement on ours. I hope that he at least understands the spirit behind the proposal.

Gareth Thomas: I am interested in the hon. Gentleman's point about blackmail. Would not importing the proposed requirement into the Bill be rather counter-productive? Would not the mischief to which he refers be more likely to happen in those circumstances?

Nick Hawkins: I thought about that point quite a lot when drafting the amendments. I wondered which scenario was better, and came down on the side of the argument that says that no one who has had a criminal conviction should be employed as a security guard. If that were clear in the Bill, the situation described should simply not arise. It is a judgment call, and that is the judgment that I came to. I hope, therefore, that the Minister will accept either amendment No. 29 or a variant of it whose wording may be more appropriate.

Christopher Leslie: This important part of the Bill merits significant attention. The high level of responsibility attached to the role of court security officer makes recruitment of the right people and effective training essential. The employer, court users and the wider public must have confidence that an officer will use his or her powers and carry out his or her duties in a fair, efficient and responsible way. Effective training and appropriate personal qualities are essential in inspiring such trust. That is an element of the rationale of part 4 of the Bill.
 The hon. Member for Surrey Heath has spoken to a series of amendments. Clause 51 gives the Lord Chancellor the power to make provision, by regulations, as to training courses to be completed and conditions to be met before a person may be designated as a court security officer. Amendment No. 63 would change that power to a duty, and amendment No. 64 would require that any regulations included conditions as to good character. Amendment No. 29 would introduce a total prohibition on persons with any sort of criminal record being considered for appointment as court security officers. 
 In many ways, amendment No. 63 seems quite similar to amendment No. 65 to clause 56. We shall reach that amendment at some point, but it could easily have been grouped with this one. The importance of publicly demonstrating that we are recruiting appropriate people to be court security officers is recognised. It is vital that we can reassure 
 court users, the judiciary and staff that court security officers are suitably and sufficiently trained to enable them to use their powers lawfully and effectively. The Department intends to make appropriate provision by regulations in due course. Those will set out the areas covered by court security officer training and ensure that the conditions of service are considered suitable. 
 I am concerned about the phrasing of the amendment that would turn the power to make regulations into a duty. It would replace the word ''may'' with ''shall''. Although we fully expect to make regulations on these matters, it would not be appropriate for the Bill to require us to do so. If we changed the word ''may'' to ''shall'', the Lord Chancellor would be required to make regulations covering everything in clause 51, but in reality there may be no need to make regulations on every one of those factors. 
 For example, earlier today we debated clause 17(5), and I pointed out that no rules had been made under the equivalent of subsection (5)(c). If that power had been a duty, the Lord Chancellor would have been required to make regulations on that point. The hon. Member for Somerton and Frome asked about the experience that justices of the peace would have to have had to entitle them to vote in elections. 
 If the word ''shall'' had been used instead of the word ''may'' in clause 17(5), we would have been required to make regulations to that effect. That is one of the reasons why we have used the term ''may'' instead of ''shall'', because it gives us some discretion.

Gareth Thomas: Is it not the case that, as a matter of good practice and good governance, the Government should not necessarily have a duty to make regulations? Does the Minister agree with me that it seems rather contradictory for the Conservatives, who so often complain about over-regulation, to require regulations to be made? It is not the first time during the Committee that they have made that sort of point.

Christopher Leslie: My hon. Friend makes a legitimate point. The hon. Member for Surrey Heath was the first to acknowledge that this was what one might call a ''standard'' amendment to be tabled for the Committee stage of a Bill.

Nick Hawkins: I entirely take the Minister's point, and that of the hon. Member for Clwyd, West (Gareth Thomas). However, I made the point that, unlike the subsection of clause 17 to which the Minister referred, with this provision I could not envisage a situation in which a Lord Chancellor would not be making the regulations. We are discussing important issues, such as the conditions to be met before a person may be designated as a court security officer, and training courses for security officers, and so I assume that there will be regulations. That is why in this case, it would be more appropriate than in some other circumstances to use ''shall'' rather than ''may.''

Christopher Leslie: We have discussed that point, but I still err on the side of good drafting and of ensuring that
 our approach throughout the Bill is consistent—and I believe that the current drafting of the Bill is correct.
 Amendment No. 64 seeks to introduce the requirement that court security officers be of ''good character'', and to include that qualifier in the Bill. The role of a court security officer carries a high level of responsibility, and people would expect such officers to be of good character. We believe that it is inherent and implicit in the position that the person who is appointed will be of good character. We agree that when regulations are made setting out the conditions to be met before a person can be designated as a court security officer, conditions involving good character will rank as a high priority. 
 It would therefore be superfluous to mention that particular condition in the Bill, when there might be many other equally important conditions concerning what would make a good court security officer, which could be contained in subsequent regulations. I believe that, given the difficulties of defining good character in the Bill, the amendment should be withdrawn. 
 We believe amendment No. 29 to be undesirable from both a practical and a policy perspective. The reference to 
''any kind of criminal offence''
 would include spent convictions which, under the Rehabilitation of Offenders Act 1974, cannot generally be taken into account when assessing suitability for employment, except for employment in a limited and specified number of occupations. Court security officers are not currently one of those exempted occupations.

Nick Hawkins: I rather anticipated that the Minister might say that. I therefore ask him to consider seriously, with his officials and his ministerial colleagues, whether that occupation should be one of those exceptions.
 I said in my initial remarks that we are all in favour of the rehabilitation of offenders. However, we are discussing the security of courts. If the amendment is not accepted or the employment category not changed, I do not want to see, in a few years' time, an escape that turns out to have been organised by a person who has been accepted for employment as a court security officer on the basis that their serious conviction had occurred a long time in the past.

Christopher Leslie: One can never predict what will happen in the future, but in framing the legislation we must ensure that we strike the right balance. I believe that, given the strict limitations on the powers of court security officers contained in the Bill, and the vetting procedures that will apply, there is no reason for us to change the attitude that we have taken so far. However, I understand the basis on which the hon. Gentleman proposed the amendment. We appreciate the importance of ensuring that court security officers pass appropriate background security checks prior to appointment, and the hon. Gentleman has raised a significant issue.
 There are several methods of carrying out those background checks, and in the future the Department will aim to use the basic disclosure service offered by 
 the Criminal Records Bureau. Once that is available, it will provide a criminal record check incorporating several levels of disclosure for different types of employment. In the meantime, the Department will carry out checks on all contractors and in-house security guards. All employees and contractors must be subject to the basic check, which will clarify the identity of the person concerned. 
 The counter-terrorist check must be carried out for all first and second tier Crown courts. In practice, it is carried out on everyone. It includes both a criminal records check and verification with the security services. In addition, the two security companies that supply guards throughout the Court Service are affiliated to the British Security Industry Association, and they are required to complete a 10-year employment history for all employees, together with a formal declaration of criminal record. 
 The current checks undertaken by the Department are therefore comprehensive and lawful. That will continue to be the case when the current procedures give way to the Criminal Records Bureau. There are thorough, comprehensive arrangements in place that strike the right balance, but keep within the scope of the Rehabilitation of Offenders Act. On that basis, I invite the hon. Gentleman to withdraw his amendment.

Nick Hawkins: As I said, I am not at all happy with such an explanation. We shall definitely return to such matters on Report. I shall not take up the Committee's time by pressing the amendment to a Division, but the matter is crucial. We must bear in mind the recent history of problems with the Criminal Records Bureau. In an earlier debate, reference was made to matters that are checked in other countries. A few weeks ago, I was involved in a debate on the Criminal Records Bureau when it became clear that a lot of its work was being done in India by private sector contractors. Concerns were expressed about that. The history of the Criminal Records Bureau is one of the most embarrassing for the Government, and it continues to be so.
 I am not reassured by the Minister's words. I know that he is well-intentioned, but there is something serious involved and the interests of court security must be put ahead of the rehabilitation of offenders. I accept that he will talk to officials. It is exactly what I would expect of him, as I know him to be extremely diligent. I advise him to discuss the matter with the right hon. Member for Walsall, South and the people at the new Security Industry Authority to see whether he can table Government amendments on Report to toughen up the Bill. 
 I stick to the view of those on the Conservative Benches. A criminal conviction ought to be an absolute bar, and I am not yet happy that we have the checks in place to prevent a potentially dangerous criminal from escaping from a court as a result of the fact that somebody who was not vetted thoroughly enough was employed as a security officer. We shall return to the issue, but I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment. 
 Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

David Heath: I beg to move amendment No. 132, in
clause 51, page 25, line 7, at end insert— 
 '(c) requirements in respect of the uniform or badge to be worn by a court security officer to ensure that he is clearly identifiable— 
 (i) as a court security officer; and 
 (ii) by his individual name or number.'.
 I shall deal with the amendment extraordinarily quickly because, by my reckoning, we now have less than two minutes to spend on each clause that has been selected for discussion today. Amendment No. 132 suggests that the Lord Chancellor may by regulation make requirements in respect of uniforms or badges worn by security officers. There is already sensible provision in clause 51 for the court security officer to be identifiable by means of his uniform or badge. 
 A person should be able to identify an individual officer. The officers have substantial powers similar to those of a police officer, including powers of search, powers to restrain, exclude or remove persons. When they are exercising those powers, they should be identifiable to the person on whom they are exercising those powers as an individual, so that, if there is any complaint about the conduct of an officer, it can be correctly attributed to a particular officer instead of the generality of court security officers. Not only is it necessary to set out what is required in terms of uniform but an individual number or name should be clearly included so that the officer can be identified.

Nick Hawkins: I shall also be brief. The hon. Gentleman may find that there is even less time if the information coming to me is correct because we may be about to have a Division in the House.
 I agree with this sensible amendment to require clear identification and I need say no more than that I concur with the hon. Gentleman.

Christopher Leslie: I, too, will be brief. I understand the hon. Gentleman's point in tabling the amendment, although I emphasise the provisions in subsection (3), which give a measure of protection, although not necessarily with the detail that he seeks.
 One of my concerns about the amendment is that it is not appropriate to prescribe in regulations the type and style of the uniform or badge that a security officer wears. That is an administrative matter and not appropriate for that secondary legislative tier. Moreover, subsection (3) makes explicit the requirement that a court security officer acting in the execution of his duty must be easily identifiable as such. Departmental guidelines will be produced for in-house staff and contractual standards for external security officers will specify the uniform, and that badges or other items must enable easy identification. That will be evident to those drawing up the guidelines.

David Heath: The Minister is going a long way towards what I want, but he has not yet said whether there will be a requirement for an officer to be individually recognisable. That is very important. It exists for police officers and many other officers in uniform. It should exist for court security officers.

Christopher Leslie: I recognise the strength of the hon. Gentleman's argument, but we have not decided what level of detail should be in the guidelines. However, as
 there has been strong representation about the importance of some level of individual identification, whether by name or number, and the hon. Gentleman's comments have been recorded, I will give closer consideration to them when I look at the guidelines.

Gareth Thomas: People are often confused in court and I know from experience that they often mistake ushers for security people.

Christopher Leslie: Again, that involves having different uniforms so that security officers are easily identifiable from ushers, but that will have to be dealt with as an administrative matter when the design of uniforms and so on is considered. It is not appropriate for that to be in the regulations and I hope that the hon. Member for Somerton and Frome will withdraw his amendment.

David Heath: I disagree with the Minister and believe that the matter should be covered in regulations because it is crucial. However, I do not intend to pursue it today and I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
 Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Clause 52 - Powers of Search

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

Bill O'Brien: With this it will be convenient to take new clause 1—Interpretation of sections 52 and 53—
'In sections 52 and 53 the term ''any person'' does not include judges, barristers, solicitors and justices of the peace who are present in, or seeking to enter, a court building for the purposes of their duties.'.

Nick Hawkins: I shall have to be brief because the Division Bell may ring at any moment. I want to make it clear that we feel strongly about new clause 1 and if the guillotine prevents the Minister from responding in detail this afternoon, I hope that he understands that we shall certainly return to the matter on Report.
 As I made clear in a debate on a previous group of amendments, we are very concerned about court security, but we are also concerned that those who are representing the forces of justice and law and order 
 should not have their passage into and out of courts delayed unnecessarily. New clause 1 is simply to ensure that the provisions of clauses 52 and 53 should not delay those who are concerned with the administration of justice. From my fairly extensive experience of practice in the courts—from the Court of Appeal and divisional court to the magistrates courts—there is a greater level of security in some court buildings than others. That is understandable, but we do not want every judge or lay magistrate, nor all barristers and solicitors to have to go through a slow and tortuous searching process along with defendants and witnesses. That would be nonsense. 
 Even if the Minister cannot accept new clause 1, I hope that he will at least talk to officials to see whether something can be done. Although searching is important—it is right that it should be included in the Bill—it should not delay those who are concerned with the administration of justice. It is a small, shortly stated point, but an important one. I hope that the Minister will respond positively, if not today then on another occasion. If he cannot accept it today, I hope that he will take seriously what I have said, as we shall return to the matter. 
 Sitting suspended for a Division in the House. 
 On resuming— 
 It being after Five o'clock, The Chairman proceeded, pursuant to Sessional Order D [29 October 2002] and the Orders of the Committee [26 June 2003 and this day], to put forthwith the Question already proposed from the Chair. 
 Question put, That the clause stand part of the Bill. 
 Clause 52 ordered to stand part of the Bill. 
 The Chairman then proceeded to put forthwith the Question necessary to dispose of the business to be concluded at that time. 
 Clauses 53 to 57 ordered to stand part of the Bill. 
 Further consideration adjourned.—[Ms Bridget Prentice.] 
 Adjourned accordingly at eleven minutes past Five o'clock till Tuesday 8 July at half-past Nine o'clock.